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Abstract
A general procedure to formulate asexual (unstructured, deterministic) pop-
ulation dynamical models resulting from individual pairwise interactions is
proposed. Individuals are characterized by a continuous strategy that repre-
sents all their behavioral, morphological, and functional traits. Populations
group conspecific individuals with identical strategy and are measured by
densities in space. Species can be monomorphic, if only one strategy is
present, or polymorphic otherwise. The procedure highlights the structural
properties fulfilled by the population per-capita growth rates. In particular,
the effect of perturbing a set of similar strategies is proportional to the prod-
uct of the corresponding densities, with a proportionality coefficient that is
density-dependent only through the total density. This generalizes the law
of mass action, which traditionally refers to the case in which the per-capita
growth rates are linearly density-dependent and insensitive to joint strategy
perturbations. Being underpinned with individual strategies, the proposed
procedure is most useful for evolutionary considerations, in the case strategies
are inheritable. The developed body of theory is exemplified on a Holling-
type-II many-prey-one-predator system and on a model of a cannibalistic
community.
Keywords: ecological modeling, functional response, individual strategy,
invasion fitness, Lotka-Volterra, mass action, pairwise interactions,
phenotypic trait, population dynamics.
1. Introduction
A significant part of ecological modeling describes large (technically in-
finite) populations, measured by finite densities per unit of space and com-
posed of asexual individuals interacting in pairs (see, e.g., Gurney and Nisbet,
1998; Thieme, 2003; Hastings and Gross, 2012). The underlying paradigm
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is that of the “mass action,” introduced in 1864 as a model for the kinet-
ics of chemical reactions (Waage and Gulberg, 1864; Lund, 1965). In the
ecological context, individuals are thought as the molecules of a well mixed
fluid and population densities as the concentrations of the chemical species.
Individuals can react by themselves (on a Poissonian basis) turning from one
state into another—e.g. dying or switching from food handling to search-
ing —or at pairwise random encounters—e.g. between prey and predator.
The simultaneous encounter of more than two individuals is a higher-order
process (with a probability to occur in an infinitesimal time interval dt that
vanishes at least as dt2) and is disregarded (it gives no contribution in the
limit dt→ 0).
The law of mass action leads to Lotka-Volterra ecological models (Lotka,
1920; Volterra, 1926), i.e., ODE models for the dynamics of the population
densities characterized by density dependencies that are at most quadratic.
In other words, once factoring the population density, the remaining per-
capita (or per-unit-of-density) growth rate is linearly density-dependent. Think,
e.g., of a monomorphic predator harvesting a polymorphic prey. The model
can be given in terms of equivalent chemical reactions, that translate into
the ODEs describing the reactions’ kinetics (see Box 1). Prey individuals are
characterized by a continuous strategy x, representing all their behavioral,
morphological, and functional traits, and individuals with same strategy xi
are grouped into the population with density ni, i = 1,...,M . Predators are
all identical. They could also be described in terms of a strategy, but this is
left implicit to focus on prey polymorphism.
Nonlinear per-capita growth rates can be obtained by structuring the
populations into behavioral states, setting mass action laws for the density
fluxes among the different states, and using time-scale separation arguments
to force the fast behavioral dynamics at equilibrium (see e.g. Ruxton et al.,
1992). The famous Holling type II functional response for predation can be
derived along this line (see Box 2).
A nonlinear density dependence in the per-capita growth rate of an un-
structured population—hereafter “nonlinear fitness” (Metz et al., 1992)—
describes the fact that individuals encounter other individuals who are at
the same time involved in other encounters or activities. As a result, not
all the encounters trigger the corresponding reaction. Prey, for example, do
not react with all encountered predators, as some of them are handling other
prey. This becomes evident when the predator population is structured into
behavioral states (Box 2), as prey react only with searching predators.
In this paper I propose a procedure to directly build nonlinear fitnesses,
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explicitly taking into account that pairwise interactions can depend on the
concomitant activities of the encountered individuals. The focus is on a given
species—e.g. the prey as in Box 1—which is thought to be polymorphic, with
individuals grouped according to the value of a continuous strategy x. The
focus species may interact with other species, the strategies of which are
however left implicit. The target is to define the so-called fitness generat-
ing function (or g-function, Vincent and Brown, 2005) for the focus species,
namely a function of a “virtual” strategy x′ that gives for x′ = xi the per-
capita growth rate of population i, i = 1,...,M (technically, the g-function
gives the fitness of the strategy x′ at zero density in an environment where the
strategies x1, x2,..., xM , as well as the other species, are present at nonzero
densities). The g-function takes as arguments, other than the virtual strat-
egy x′, a set of “environmental variables” which describe how the strategy
x′ interacts with all the biotic and abiotic components of its environment.
The core of the approach is in the definition of these environmental variables.
In particular, the intra-specific interactions between the strategy x′ and the
resident strategies x1, x2,..., xM are built through an iterative procedure that,
at each step, integrates over the strategy space suitable interacting terms,
which, in turn, may depend on the integrals computed in the previous steps.
In this way, the interactions that do not depend on the concurrent activities
of the interacting conspecifics only need one step, while those depending on
the others’ activities up to a certain level of nesting do require more steps.
The so constructed g-function has built-in all the structural properties one
should expect to hold, for consistency, when some of the conspecific morphs
are similar or vanishing. E.g., if x1 = x2 one should be able to rewrite a
reduced g-function where only one of the two strategies is present with density
n1 + n2. And a similar property holds for the g-function derivatives w.r.t.
the resident strategies: the effect (on the growth of the virtual strategy x′) of
perturbing a resident strategy is proportional to the corresponding density
through a coefficient that, when all strategies are equal, can be density-
dependent only through the total density of the species. This is again the
law of mass-action (as it can be verified in Box 1), using which, however, the
proportionality coefficient is density-independent. The proposed procedure
therefore generalizes the law. Specifically, it shows that the effect of a higher-
order perturbation w.r.t. a subset of the resident strategies is given by a sum
of terms, each proportional to the product of the corresponding densities,
with each density up to the power of the corresponding differentiation order.
And the proportionality coefficients depend on the total density of the species
when all strategies are equal. Note, in particular, that mixed derivatives,
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w.r.t. different resident strategies, may have effect, though this is not the
case when strict mass-action is used (Box 1), resulting only in a linear density
effect in the pure fitness derivatives of any order.
Although quite technical, the generalized mass-action property has a
great impact in the theoretical analysis, in particular in studying the com-
petition between similar strategies. This is typically done by expanding
the g-function of the focus species around a reference strategy x, so the g-
derivatives w.r.t. the resident strategies that appear in the expansion are
evaluated with all resident strategies at x, and the property can be use-
fully exploited. Specifically, it is possible to express the g-derivatives in the
expansion in terms of the derivatives of the monomorphic g-function—the
g-function for M = 1. This is particularly interesting because it means that
the competition between the reference strategy and similar (potentially in-
vading) ones can be studied by looking at reference strategy alone. When
we go to evolutionary considerations (Dercole and Rinaldi, 2008), the ex-
pansion of the dimorphic fitness (M = 2) w.r.t. (x1, x2) around (x, x) can
be again expressed, thanks to the generalized mass action, in terms of the
monomorphic fitness. The evolutionary dynamics of the focus species locally
to an evolutionary branching (Geritz et al., 1997, 1998) can then be studied
in terms of the geometry of the monomorphic fitness.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 the general procedure to
build the g-function for the focus species is presented (Subsects. 2.1 and 2.2)
and its structural properties highlighted (Subsects. 2.3 and 2.4). Boxes 3
and 4 exemplify the procedure for the M-prey-one-predator model in Box 2
and for an evolutionary model of cannibalism taken from the literature (Der-
cole and Rinaldi, 2002; Dercole, 2003). All the computations are performed in
a Mathematica script accompanying the paper (as Supplementary Material),
that can be easily adapted for use with any ecological models. Sect. 3 dis-
cusses the obtained results and, in particular, their relevance in the opening
of new theoretical research directions.
2. Methods
2.1. Basic notation and assumptions
Consider anM-morphic species—the focus species—characterized by strate-
gies x1, x2,..., xM and population densities n1(t), n2(t),..., nM (t) at time t. In-
dividuals can interact in pairs with other conspecifics, or with individuals be-
longing to other species, the latter described by a set of P populations (some
of which may be conspecific) with densities N1(t), N2(t),..., NP (t). The eco-
logical dynamics of the population densities are modeled in continuous time
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by a set of ODEs of the form
n˙i = ni gM(n1:M , N1:P , x1:M , xi, t), i = 1,...,M, (1a)
N˙1:P = FM(n1:M , N1:P , x1:M , t), (1b)
where, hereafter, n1:M , N1:P , and x1:M respectively stand for n1,..., nM , N1,..., NP ,
and x1,..., xM ,
gM(n1:M , N1:P , x1:M , x
′, t)
is the M-morphic g-function associated with the focus species (Vincent and
Brown, 2005), and
FM(n1:M , N1:P , x1:M , t)
is a vector of P functions collecting the population growth rates of the pop-
ulations N1,..., NP of different species (note that FM,p/Np is the per-capita
growth rate of population Np, p = 1,...,P ).
Namely, gM is the per-capita growth rate of a (virtual) strategy x
′ with
zero density in an environment set by the resident strategies x1, x2,..., xM ,
with densities n1, n2,..., nM , together with the populations N1,..., NP of dif-
ferent species and the abiotic environmental conditions at time t. Note the
list of arguments in functions gM and FM . First the dynamical variables n1:M
and N1:P , then the strategies x1:M and x
′, which play the role of parameters
in model (1), and last the time t that takes possible time-dependencies of
the abiotic environment into account (e.g. seasonalities and climatic fluctu-
ations).
Let me define the density distribution ν of the resident strategies
ν(x, x1:M , n1:M) :=
M∑
j=1
njδ(x− xj), (2)
where x is a variable spanning the strategy space and δ(x− xj) is the Dirac
peak at x = xj . Note that ν does not explicitly depend on time, though it
changes in time due to the dynamics of the densities n1,n2,..., nM .
As explicitly noted in Mesze´na et al. (2005), a contribution that I will fur-
ther discuss in Sect. 3, the g-function operates on ν (other than on (x′, N1:P , t)).
This is the key fact ensuring that gM satisfies all natural consistency proper-
ties, namely the fact that if the virtual strategy x′ interacts with strategy xi,
the same interaction then occurs with strategies xj , j 6= i, and if xi = xj then
the sum ni+nj matters in lieu of ni and nj independently. Instead of having
ν as a direct argument of the g-function (as in Mesze´na et al., 2005)—which
requires the definition of the functional derivative w.r.t. a distribution—I use
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the notion of environmental feedback (introduced by Mylius and Diekmann,
1995; Gyllenberg and Metz, 2001) to define the function gM , forM = 1, 2,...,
through the application of an M-independent function g that operates on
the virtual strategy x′ and on a set of relevant “environmental quantities.”
In formulas, I set
gM(n1:M , N1:P , x1:M , x
′, t) :=
g(x′, En(x
′, x1:M , n1:M , N1:P , e(t)), EN(x1:M , n1:M , N1:P , e(t)), N1:P , e(t)),
(3a)
where
– En(x
′, x1:M , n1:M , N1:P , e) is a set of functions of the strategy x
′ that
characterize the interactions of the x′-strategist with its conspecifics
(these functions may depend on N1:P if the interaction extends to some
of the other species, e.g. predation in Box 4);
– EN(x1:M , n1:M , N1:P , e) is a set of functions describing the interactions
of the individuals of populations N1,..., NP with the resident strategies
x1, x2,..., xM (these interactions may affect those with the x
′-strategists);
– e(t) is the set of, possibly fluctuating, abiotic environmental factors.
In other words, the quantities in En, EN , N1:P and in e define the biotic
(intra- and inter-specific) and abiotic environments that the virtual strategy
x′ is facing at time t, i.e., the quantities that are needed at time t to determine
the fitness of the strategy. Similarly, I set
FM(n1:M , N1:P , x1:M , t) := F (EN(x1:M , n1:M , N1:P , e(t)), N1:P , e(t)). (3b)
The point is now how the function sets En and EN are defined over the
distribution ν. Here is where I introduce the iterative procedure.
2.2. The iterative procedure for building nonlinear fitnesses
Being constrained to smoothly operate on the distribution ν in (2), only
integrals over the whole strategy space are allowed. Let me start with the
intra-specific interactions described by the environmental quantities in E and
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apply the integrals recursively as follows:
E(1)n (x
′, x1:M, n1:M, e) :=
∫
e(1)n (x
′, x, e)ν(x, x1:M, n1:M)dx
=
M∑
j=1
e(1)n (x
′, xj , e)nj, (4a)
E(2)n (x
′, x1:M, n1:M, N1:P , e) :=
∫
e(2)n (x
′, x,E(1)n (x, x1:M, n1:M, e), N1:P , e)
× ν(x, x1:M, n1:M)dx
=
M∑
j=1
e(2)n (x
′, xj ,E
(1)
n (xj , x1:M, n1:M, e), N1:P , e)nj , (4b)
...
E(L)n (x
′, x1:M, n1:M, N1:P , e) :=
∫
e(L)n (x
′, x,E(1:L−1)n (x, x1:M, n1:M, N1:P , e), N1:P , e)
× ν(x, x1:M, n1:M)dx
=
M∑
j=1
e(L)n (x
′, xj ,E
(1:L−1)
n (xj , x1:M, n1:M, N1:P , e), N1:P , e)nj, (4c)
where e
(1)
n ,..., e
(L)
n are suitable interacting kernels, i.e., vectors of functions
(possibly affected by the abiotic environment e) describing the pairwise in-
teractions of the virtual strategy x′ with the generic strategy x spanning the
strategy space (E
(1:L−1)
n stands for E
(1)
n ,...,E
(L−1)
n ). And let me then collect
all the environmental quantities E
(l)
n , l=1,..., L, in
En(x
′, x1:M, n1:M, N1:P , e) := [E
(1)
n (x
′, x1:M, n1:M, e),...,E
(L)
n (x
′, x1:M, n1:M, N1:P , e)].
(5)
Note that x is here treated, for simplicity, as a one-dimensional strategy, but
this is not necessary.
The first integral step in (4a) describes the interactions that are not af-
fected by the concurrent intra-specific activities of the involved resident in-
dividual. If such type of interactions contribute to the growth rate of the
virtual strategy x′, then the first environmental component E
(1)
n is a direct
argument of function g in (3a). The second integral step in (4b) describes the
interactions that are affected by the concurrent (intra-specific) activities of
the involved xj-strategist, and such dependence is accounted for by the E
(1)
n -
dependence of e
(2)
n (e
(2)
n might also depend on N1:P , in case the concurrent
xj-activity extends to some of the other species, e.g. predation in Box 4).
Note that E
(1)
n in the integral in (4b) is evaluated for x′ = x, and x takes
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value xj in the resulting sum, so E
(1)
n there describes the interactions of the
xj-strategist that are not affected by the concurrent (intra-specific) activities
of the involved xk-strategist, k 6= j, j = 1,...,M . If they were affected, then
a further integral step would be required. In this way, one can describe the
interactions of the x′-strategist that are affected by the concurrent (intra-
specific) activities of the involved resident individual up to a finite level of
nesting.
A similar integral is used to define the set of functions EN :
EN(x1:M, n1:M,N1:P , e) :=
∫
eN (x, En(x, x1:M, n1:M,N1:P , e),N1:P , e)
× ν(x, x1:M, n1:M)dx
=
M∑
j=1
eN(xj , En(xj , x1:M, n1:M,N1:P , e),N1:P , e)nj .(6)
Here only one step is sufficient. When an individual of population Np,
p = 1,...,P , encounters an xj-strategist, the effect of their interaction can
depend on the concomitant activities of the encountered individual. The
intra-specific ones are accounted for by the (possible) En-dependency of the
interacting kernel eN (note the first argument x of En in the left-hand side
of (6), that takes value xj in sum at the right-hand side), whereas other
inter-specific activities can be described through the N1:P -dependency of the
growth rates in g and F (see Boxes 3 and 4 for two specific examples).
Of course, I do not claim that all smooth functions gM and FM in (3a,
b) can be obtained through the above procedure, but certainly all pairwise
interactions can be described.
2.3. The fitness’ structural properties
In this section I present four structural properties that are satisfied by a
g-function defined as in eq. (3a) through the iterative procedure (4–6).
P1: gM(n1:M , N1:P , x1:M , x
′, t)
∣∣∣
n1=0
= gM−1(n2:M , N1:P , x2:M , x
′, t),
i.e., the fitness of the strategy x′ is not affected by the strategy x1 of
an absent population.
P2: gM(n1:M , N1:P , x1:M , x
′, t)
∣∣∣
x1=x2=x
= gM([α(n1+n2), (1−α)(n1+n2), n3:M ], N1:P , [x, x, x3:M ], x
′, t)
= gM−1([n1+n2, n3:M ], N1:P , [x, x3:M ], x
′, t),
for any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, i.e., any partitioning of the total density n1+n2
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into two subpopulations with same strategy x must result in the same
per-capita growth rate for the strategy x′.
P3: gM([n2, n1, n3:M ], N1:P , [x2, x1, x3:M ], x
′, t) = gM(n1:M , N1:P , x1:M , x
′, t),
i.e., the order in which populations 1 and 2 are listed does not matter.
P4: ∂
x
d1
1,...,x
dk
k
gM(n1:M,N1:P ,x1:M,x
′, t)
∣∣∣
x1=···=xM=x
=
d1∑
i1=1
···
dk∑
ik=1
φd1,...,dk, i1,...,ik(n,N1:P ,x,x
′, t)ni11 ··· n
ik
k ,
for suitable functions φ’s, d1,...,dk≥ 1, 1≤ k≤M , and n :=
∑M
j=1nj.
This property is not obvious to be intuitively justified and is the main
contribution of this work. As anticipated in the Introduction, it gen-
eralizes the principle of mass-action, by assuming that gM describes
pairwise interactions between the target x′-strategist and the resident
strategies x1:M (or individuals of different species), which are, as well,
involved in pairwise interactions. As a consequence, when considering
identical resident strategies, x1 = x2 = · · ·= xM = x, the sensitivity of
gM w.r.t. the resident strategies xj is proportional to the correspond-
ing density nj , with a proportionality coefficient that can be density-
dependent only as a function of the total density n. Moreover, due to
nonlinear density dependencies in gM , higher powers of nj may appear
in further derivatives, up to the order dj of differentiation.
Properties P1–4 can be generalized and combined to produce further rela-
tions among g-derivatives. P1 and P2 obviously link gM to gM−k if k resident
strategies are absent and if k + 1 resident strategies are equal, respectively.
In particular, by P2, we have
gM(n1:M , N1:P , x1:M , x
′, t)
∣∣∣
x1=···=xM=x
=
gM−1([n1+n2, n3:M ], N1:P , [x, x3:M ], x
′, t)
∣∣∣
x3=···=xM=x
= · · · =
gM−k([n1+···+nk+1, nk+2:M ], N1:P , [x, xk+2:M ], x
′, t)
∣∣∣
xk+2=···=xM=x
= · · · =
g1(n,N1:P , x, x
′, t), (7)
and derivatives w.r.t. the resident densities can be added, as the evaluation
at x1 = · · · = xM = x can be taken before the differentiation, thus obtaining:
∂
n
l1
1 , ...,n
lM
M
gM(n1:M , N1:P , x1:M , x
′, t)
∣∣∣
x1=···=xM=x
= ∂nl1+···+lM g1(n,N1:P , x, x
′, t).
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That is, nj- and nk-perturbations simply perturb the total density nj+ nk if
the two populations have the same strategy x.
Property P3 obviously holds for any permutation of the elements in n1:M
and in x1:M in the left-hand side. And thanks to P3, also P4 can be gener-
alized to derivatives taken to any set of k resident strategies, not necessarily
the first k. Moreover, derivatives w.r.t. the densities N1:P and w.r.t. the
virtual strategy x′ can be added to all properties.
Three further remarks are due for the functions φ’s. First note that they
do not depend on the number M of considered residents, but they are rather
associated to the considered focus species. E.g., the same functions φd,i’s,
characterized by a single sum index (1-index-φ’s in the following), appear
when applying P4 to a pure-derivative of gM and of g1, i.e.,
∂xd
k
gM(n1:M , N1:P , x1:M , x
′, t)
∣∣∣
x1=···=xM=x
=
d∑
i=1
φd,i(n,N1:P , x, x
′, t)nik,
∂xg1(n,N1:P , x, x
′, t) =
d∑
i=1
φd,i(n,N1:P , x, x
′, t)ni,
1 ≤ k ≤ M . Analogously, the same functions φd1,...,dk, i1,...,ik’s (k-index-φ’s)
appear when perturbing any set of k different resident strategies.
Second, by property P3, we obviously have
φd2,d1,d3,...,dk, i2,i1,i3,...,ik = φd1,d2,d3,...,dk, i1,i2,i3,...,ik , (8)
that easily generalizes to any permutation of the indexes d1,..., dk and i1,..., ik
in the left-hand side.
Third, there are also links between the k- and k′-index-φ’s, k′ < k, of the
same order (same sums d := d1+···+dk ≥ k and d1+···+dk′). They come from
properties P2 and P4, by x-differentiating (7) d times, applying P4, and then
collecting the same powers of the resident densities at both sides of an equal
sign. E.g., for d = 2 and considering the left- and right-most sides of (7), we
get
M∑
i=1
∂x2i gM(n1:M , N1:P , x1:M , x
′, t)
∣∣∣
x1=···=xM=x
+
2
M−1∑
i=1
M∑
j=i+1
∂xi,xjgM(n1:M , N1:P , x1:M , x
′, t)
∣∣∣
x1=···=xM=x
= ∂x2g1(n,N1:P , x, x
′, t),
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which becomes by P4
M∑
i=1
(
φ2,1(n,N1:P , x, x
′, t)ni + φ2,2(n,N1:P , x, x
′, t)n2i
)
+
2
M−1∑
i=1
M∑
j=i+1
φ1,1,1,1(n,N1:P , x, x
′, t)ninj =
φ2,1(n,N1:P , x, x
′, t)
M∑
i=1
ni + φ2,2(n,N1:P , x, x
′, t)
( M∑
i=1
n2i + 2
M−1∑
i=1
M∑
j=i+1
ninj
)
.
Then, the ni- and n
2
i -terms cancel out in the above equation, whereas bal-
ancing the mixed ninj-terms yields
φ1,1,1,1 = φ2,2. (9a)
For d = 3, we get
M∑
i=1
∂x3i gM(n1:M , N1:P , x1:M , x
′, t)
∣∣∣
x1=···=xM=x
+
3
M−1∑
i=1
M∑
j=i+1
∂x2
i
,xjgM(n1:M , N1:P , x1:M , x
′, t)
∣∣∣
x1=···=xM=x
+
3
M−1∑
i=1
M∑
j=i+1
∂xi,x2jgM(n1:M , N1:P , x1:M , x
′, t)
∣∣∣
x1=···=xM=x
+
6
M−2∑
i=1
M−1∑
j=i+1
M∑
k=j+1
∂xi,xj ,xkgM(n1:M , N1:P , x1:M , x
′, t)
∣∣∣
x1=···=xM=x
=
∂x3g1(n,N1:P , x, x
′, t),
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which becomes by P4
M∑
i=1
(
φ3,1(n,N1:P , x, x
′, t)ni + φ3,2(n,N1:P , x, x
′, t)n2i + φ3,3(n,N1:P , x, x
′, t)n2i
)
+
3
M−1∑
i=1
M∑
j=i+1
(
φ2,1,1,1(n,N1:P , x, x
′, t)ninj + φ2,1,2,1(n,N1:P , x, x
′, t)n2i nj
)
3
M−1∑
i=1
M∑
j=i+1
(
φ1,2,1,1(n,N1:P , x, x
′, t)ninj + φ1,2,1,2(n,N1:P , x, x
′, t)nin
2
j
)
6
M−2∑
i=1
M−1∑
j=i+1
M∑
k=j+1
φ1,1,1,1,1,1(n,N1:P , x, x
′, t)ninjnk =
φ3,1(n,N1:P , x, x
′, t)
M∑
i=1
ni + φ3,2(n,N1:P , x, x
′, t)
( M∑
i=1
n2i + 2
M−1∑
i=1
M∑
j=i+1
ninj
)
+
φ3,3(n,N1:P , x, x
′, t)
( M∑
i=1
n3i + 3
M−1∑
i=1
M∑
j=i+1
(
n2i nj+nin
2
j
)
+ 6
M−2∑
i=1
M−1∑
j=i+1
M∑
k=j+1
ninjnk
)
.
Similarly, the ni-, n
2
i -, and n
3
i -terms cancel out, whereas balancing the mixed
ninj-, n
2
i nj-, nin
2
j -, and ninjnk-terms yields
φ2,1,1,1
P3
= φ1,2,1,1 =
1
3
φ3,2, (9b)
φ2,1,2,1
P3
= φ1,2,1,2 = φ3,3, (9c)
φ1,1,1,1,1,1 = φ3,3 (9d)
(basically, φd1,...,dk,d1,...,dk = φd,d holds at any order, whereas suitable com-
binations link the φd1,...,dk, i1,...,ik ’s with some ij < dj, 1 ≥ j ≥ k, with φd,i,
i := i1+···+ ik).
In this paper, I am not focusing on the relations between (same-order)
k- and k′-index-φ’s, k′ < k. The important message here is that the g-
derivatives w.r.t. the resident strategies can be organized as in P4, i.e., as a
sum of terms each composed by a coefficient φ, function of the total density
n of the species, times powers of the densities of the perturbed strategies,
up to the order of differentiation. In Sect. 2.4 I will show how all functions
φ’s can be directly identified, without making use of their relations. Those
relations do exist—they can all be derived as exemplified above—and will be
satisfied by construction by the identified φ’s.
Finally, analogous properties obviously hold for the population growth
rates of the other species in FM :
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P1 FM(n1:M , N1:P , x1:M , t)
∣∣∣
n1=0
= FM−1(n2:M , N1:P , x2:M , t),
P2 FM(n1:M , N1:P , x1:M , t)
∣∣∣
x1=x2=x
= FM([α(n1+n2), (1−α)(n1+n2), n3:M ], N1:P , [x, x, x3:M ], t)
= FM−1,p([n1+n2, n3:M ], N1:P , [x, x3:M ], t),
P3 FM([n2, n1, n3:M ], N1:P , [x2, x1, x3:M ], t) = FM(n1:M , N1:P , x1:M , t),
P4 ∂
x
d1
1,...,x
dk
k
FM(n1:M,N1:P ,x1:M, t)
∣∣∣
x1=···=xM=x
=
d1∑
i1=1
···
dk∑
ik=1
ψd1,...,dk, i1,...,ik(n,N1:P ,x,t)n
i1
1 ··· n
ik
k ,
where ψ’s are suitable vectors of functions. And analogous generalization
and combinations go through, including the relations between (same-order)
k- and k′-index-ψ’s, k′ < k, such as
ψ1,1,1,1 = ψ2,2, (10a)
ψ2,1,1,1
P3
= ψ1,2,1,1 =
1
3
ψ3,2, (10b)
ψ2,1,2,1
P3
= ψ1,2,1,2 = ψ3,3, (10c)
ψ1,1,1,1,1,1 = ψ3,3. (10d)
However, in the following, I mainly discuss the properties of the g-function
associated to the focus species.
2.4. How the procedure secures the properties
I now show that the definition of gM (3a) and the iterative procedure (4–6)
ensure properties P1–4. I do not show the converse—a g-function satisfying
P1–4 can be defined as in (3a, 4–6) with suitable interacting kernels—though
I believe it is true.
Properties P1–4 follow directly by the integral procedure (4–6). In fact,
integrating functionals of the distribution ν over all possible resident strate-
gies implies that: the strategy xi of an absent population (ni = 0) has no
effect (P1); the densities of equal strategies can be summed up (n1δ(x−x1)+
n2δ(x− x2) = (n1+ n2)δ(x− x1) if x1 = x2) (P2); the order of the peaks in
the sum in (2) is irrelevant (P3).
Property P4 can be easily verified by means of symbolic computations
on specific examples (see the Mathematica script provided as Supplementary
Material for the examples described in Boxes 3 and 4). Specifically, given P4
as granted, the functions φd1,...,dk, i1,...,ik ’s can be uniquely identified as follows.
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For any given set set d1,..., dk, k ≥ 1, take the
(
∂ xd11,...,x
dk
k
)
-derivative of gk+1
(i.e., M = k+1) and replace, whenever possible, n1+···+nk+1 with n. This
can be systematically done by noting that the density nk+1 appears in the
resulting derivative only in sum with all other resident densities n1,..., nk,
since no differentiation is taken w.r.t. xk+1. Then, by replacing nk+1 with
n− (n1+···+nk), the sums where nk+1 was appearing before the substitution
simplifies to n, whereas all the remaining occurrences of n1,..., nk form the
monomials ni11 ··· n
ik
k in P4. Now, for each set i1,..., ik, 1≤ ij≤dj , j=1,..., k,
function φd1,...,dk, i1,...,ik can then be obtained collecting the coefficient of the
corresponding monomial. Similarly for function ψd1,...,dk, i1,...,ik .
Below I show, as a general case, that
∂x1 gM(n1:M,N1:P ,x1:M,x
′, t)
∣∣∣
x1=···=xM=x
= φ1,1(n,N1:P ,x,x
′, t)n1, (11)
i.e., property P4 for k = 1 and d1 = 1.
From definition (3a) and the chain rule, it results
1
n1
∂x1gM(n1:M,N1:P ,x1:M,x
′, t)
∣∣∣
x1=···=xM=x
=
1
n1
∂x1g(x
′, En(x
′, x1:M , n1:M ,N1:P , e), EN(x1:M , n1:M ,N1:P , e),N1:P , e)
∣∣∣
x1=···=xM=x
=(
∂En g(x
′,En, EN ,N1:P ,e)
∣∣∣En=En(x′,x1:M,n1:M,N1:P,e)
EN=EN (x1:M,n1:M,N1:P,e)
1
n1
∂x1En(x
′,x1:M,n1:M,N1:P ,e)
)∣∣∣∣
x1=···=xM=x
+
(
∂ENg(x
′,En, EN ,N1:P ,e)
∣∣∣En=En(x′,x1:M,n1:M,N1:P,e)
EN=EN (x1:M,n1:M,N1:P,e)
1
n1
∂x1EN (x1:M,n1:M,N1:P ,e)
)∣∣∣∣
x1=···=xM=x
,
(12)
where
1
n1
∂x1E
(1)
n (x
′, x1:M , n1:M , e)
∣∣∣
x1=···=xM=x
= ∂x1e
(1)
n (x
′, x1, e)
∣∣∣
x1=x
(13a)
14
and, for L > 1,
1
n1
∂x1E
(L)
n (x
′, x1:M , n1:M ,N1:P , e)
∣∣∣
x1=···=xM=x
= 1n1
[
∂x1e
(L)
n (x
′, x1, E
(1)
n ,...,E
(L−1)
n ,N1:P , e)n1
+ ∂
E
(1)
n
e(L)n (x
′, x, E(1)n ,...,E
(L−1)
n ,N1:P , e)(
∂x1E
(1)
n (x1,[x,...,x], n1:M ,e)n1+
M∑
j=1
∂x1E
(1)
n (x,x1:M, n1:M , e)nj
)
...
+ ∂
E
(L−1)
n
e(L)n (x
′, x, E(1)n ,...,E
(L−1)
n ,N1:P , e)
(
∂x1E
(L−1)
n (x1,[x,...,x], n1:M ,N1:P ,e)n1
+
M∑
j=1
∂x1E
(L−1)
n (x,x1:M, n1:M ,N1:P , e)nj
)]∣∣∣∣∣E
(1)
n =E
(1)
n (x
′,x1:M,n1:M,e)
E
(l)
n =E
(l)
n (x
′,x1:M,n1:M,N1:P ,e), l=2,...,L−1
x1=···=xM=x
=
[
∂x1e
(L)
n (x
′, x1, E
(1)
n ,...,E
(L−1)
n ,N1:P , e)
+n∂
E
(1)
n
e(L)n (x
′, x, E(1)n ,...,E
(L−1)
n ,N1:P , e)(
∂x1e1(x1, x, e)+
1
n1
∂x1E
(1)
n (x,x1:M, n1:M , e)
)
...
+n∂
E
(L−1)
n
e(L)n (x
′, x, E(1)n ,...,E
(L−1)
n ,N1:P , e)
(
∂x1e
(L−1)
n (x1,x,E
(1)
n ,...,E
(L−2)
n ,N1:P , e)
+ 1n1
∂x1E
(L−1)
n (x,x1:M, n1:M ,N1:P , e)
)]∣∣∣∣∣E
(1)
n =E
(1)
n (x
′,x1:M,n1:M,e)
E
(l)
n =E
(l)
n (x
′,x1:M,n1:M,N1:P ,e), l=2,...,L−1
x1=···=xM=x
, (13b)
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whereas
1
n1
∂x1EN (x1:M , n1:M ,N1:P , e)
∣∣∣
x1=···=xM=x
= 1n1
[
∂x1eN (x1,En, e)n1
+ ∂
E
(1)
n
eN (x,E
(1)
n ,...,E
(L)
n , e)(
∂x1E
(1)
n (x1,[x,...,x], n1:M ,e)n1+
M∑
j=1
∂x1E
(1)
n (x,x1:M, n1:M , e)nj
)
...
+ ∂
E
(L)
n
eN (x,E
(1)
n ,...,E
(L)
n , e)
(
∂x1E
(L)
n (x1,[x,...,x], n1:M ,N1:P ,e)n1
+
M∑
j=1
∂x1E
(L)
n (x,x1:M, n1:M ,N1:P , e)nj
)]∣∣∣∣∣E
(1)
n =E
(1)
n (x
′,x1:M,n1:M,e)
E
(l)
n =E
(l)
n (x
′,x1:M,n1:M,N1:P ,e), l=2,...,L
x1=···=xM=x
=
[
∂x1eN(x1,En, e)
+n∂
E
(1)
n
eN(x,E
(1)
n ,...,E
(L)
n , e)(
∂x1e1(x1, x, e)+
1
n1
∂x1E
(1)
n (x,x1:M, n1:M , e)
)
...
+n∂
E
(L)
n
eN (x,E
(1)
n ,...,E
(L)
n , e)
(
∂x1eL(x1,x,E
(1)
n ,...,E
(L−1)
n ,N1:P , e)
+ 1n1
∂x1E
(L)
n (x,x1:M, n1:M ,N1:P , e)
)]∣∣∣∣∣E
(1)
n =E
(1)
n (x
′,x1:M,n1:M,e)
E
(l)
n =E
(l)
n (x′,x1:M,n1:M,N1:P ,e), l=2,...,L
x1=···=xM=x
. (14)
Note that eq. (13b) expresses the E
(L)
n -derivative w.r.t. x1 in terms of E
(l)
n -
ones with l < L (including the 1/n1 factor in front), and should therefore be
used recursively (for decreasing L) up to L = 1, where (13a) then applies.
Once all recursions are taken and the resulting expressions substituted into
(14) and then into (12), the right hand side indeed becomes a function of
(n,N1:P ,x,x
′), that is function φ1,1 in (11). In fact, the densities n1:M appear
in the right hand side of (12) only through the environmental quantities in
En and EN , and only the total density n matters when the final evaluation
at x1= ···=xM =x is taken in eqs. (13b,14). Further note that the obtained
φ1,1 is indeed independent on the number M of considered morphs.
3. Discussion and future directions
In this paper I have developed a general procedure to formulate asexual
(unstructured, deterministic) population models resulting from individual
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pairwise interactions and possibly characterized by nonlinear density depen-
dencies in the per-capita growth rates (nonlinear fitnesses).
The models are underpinned with individual strategies that represent be-
havioral, morphological, and functional traits. Individuals are assumed to
interact in pairs and the effects of an interaction on the growth rates of the
corresponding populations is determined by the strategies of the interact-
ing individuals, other than by the current state of the biotic and abiotic
environments—the first described by the densities of all populations in the
community, the second defined by possibly fluctuating exogenous variables.
Intra- as well as inter-specific interactions are considered.
The procedure exploits the notions of fitness generating function (Vincent
and Brown, 2005) and of environmental feedback (Mylius and Diekmann,
1995; Gyllenberg and Metz, 2001), namely the practice of writing the per-
capita growth rate of a virtual population with strategy x′ (and zero density)
in two steps. First, a set of environmental quantities, possibly functions of
x′, is defined based on the biotic and abiotic components of the environment.
Then, the growth rate is written as a function of the strategy x′ and of the
environmental quantities evaluated at x′, which therefore act as a feedback
from the current state of the environment to the rule—the growth rate—
determining the (biotic) environment in the near future. When the environ-
mental quantities are all independent of x′, i.e., they are only affected by the
resident strategies present in the community, the environment is said to be
finite dimensional, with dimension given by the number of necessary quan-
tities. The environment is otherwise infinite dimensional and note that this
is the situation whenever the strategies of two conspecifics jointly determine
the result of their interaction (see e.g. prey competition in Box 3).
The environment is defined w.r.t. a focus species present in the com-
munity in M ≥ 1 resident morphs, described by strategies x1, x2,..., xM and
densities n1(t), n2(t),...,nM (t) at time t (e.g. the prey species in Box 3). The
environment is composed of four sets of quantities: E
(l)
n , l = 1,...,L, typi-
cally functions of x′ and describing the intra-specific interactions of the x′-
strategist; EN , x
′-independent and describing the inter-specific interactions
of the resident strategies x1, x2,..., xM ; the densities N1(t), N2(t),...,NP (t) of
the P ≥ 0 populations of different species; and the (possibly fluctuating)
abiotic environment e(t).
The environmental quantities in E
(l)
n are defined by an iterative procedure
(Sect. 2.2) that integrates a suitable interacting kernel e
(l)
n over the impulsive
density distribution ν (defined in eq. (2)). The interacting kernel e
(1)
n is simply
a functions of the interacting strategies (x′, xj), j = 1,...,M , and these are the
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“first-level” interactions (e.g. prey competition and predation in Box 3). But
more in general, the interacting kernel e
(L)
n of level L > 1 also depends on the
environmental quantities E
(l)
n of level l < L, characterizing the (intra-specific)
activities of xj-strategists. In this way, “second-level” interactions (L =
2) take into account that the encountered xj-strategist is involved, at the
same time, in other (intra-specific) first-level activities (see the g-function in
Box 4, second term, where the x′-strategist is cannibalized by xj-individuals
who at the same time harvest the common resource n0 and cannibalize xk-
strategists). Similarly, third- and higher-level (L > 2) interacting kernels
describe interactions that are affected by the concurrent lower-level activities
of the involved resident individual (though, to my knowledge, no model in the
literature requires more than two levels). Thus, other than the dimensionality
of the environment—that is interesting because it sets, when finite, a limit on
the number of stationarily coexisting morphs of the focus species (Diekmann
et al., 2003; Mesze´na et al., 2006)—the proposed procedure highlights another
characterizing feature of the environmental feedback, i.e., the number L of
“interacting levels.” In other words, the L− 1 is the the number of nested
intra-specific interacting dependencies.
Note that Geritz (2005) distinguishes between linear and nonlinear envi-
ronments, which basically corresponds to the distinction L = 1 and L > 1,
respectively. In fact, while the environmental quantities in E
(1)
n are necessar-
ily linear in the densities of the resident strategies, nonlinearities may appear
only through the dependency of an interacting kernel e
(L)
n of level L > 1 on
a lower-level quantity E
(l)
n , l < L. Thus, not all nonlinearities are allowed,
only those that can be obtained through the proposed procedure.
The procedure also highlights the structural properties fulfilled by the
population per-capita growth rates (Sect. 2.3). While properties P1–3 are
rather obvious, property P4 is more involved. It basically generalizes the
law of mass-action that, in the case of unstructured populations, only yields
per-capita growth rates with linear density-dependence and coefficients that
are functions of the strategies of the two interacting individuals (see Box 1).
Thus, property P4 under strict mass-action simply says that, when all strate-
gies are identical, pure fitness derivatives w.r.t. a resident strategy are pro-
portional to the corresponding density (through a density-independent pro-
portionality coefficient) and all mixed derivatives are null. But when fitnesses
are nonlinear, terms proportional to powers of the densities of the perturbed
strategies appear, in accordance to the scheme described in Sect. 2.3. Note
that strict mass-action implies a linear environment (L = 1), though a non-
linear fitness might arise in one- as well as multi-level environments (see
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Box 3 and 4, respectively).
Note also that property P4 can be further generalized. In fact, if only a
subset x1, x2,..., xm, m<M , of the resident strategies are identical to x, then,
when perturbing k of those strategies, the functions φ’s and ψ’s take the sum
n1+···+nm and the other densities nm+1,..., nM , as well as the strategy x
and the other strategies xm+1,..., xM , as independent arguments. Moreover,
properties P1–4 are not necessarily due to the pairwise nature of the allowed
interactions. In a modeling framework where k-wise group interactions, k≥ 3,
are relevant, they could be accounted for by an iterative procedure (just like
that in Sect. 2.2) with (k− 1)-dimensional integrals, and properties P1–4
would still follow, though their derivation from the procedure would be more
involved.
The structure of the fitness derivatives w.r.t. the resident strategies have
already been considered by Mesze´na et al. (2005), who define the per-capita
growth rate of a virtual strategy x′ in a single-species polymorphic commu-
nity as an x′-dependent functional r over the distribution ν. Taking the
derivative of r(x′, ν) w.r.t. a resident strategy xi then requires a notion for
the functional derivative of r w.r.t. the distribution ν that preserves the chain
rule—a concept defined by Mesze´na et al. (2005) in Appendix. Exploiting
this concept, they were able to show that the fitness derivative w.r.t. a resi-
dent strategy is proportional to the density of the perturbed strategy with a
proportionality coefficient that is density-dependent only through the total
density of the species, i.e., property P4 for k = 1 and d1 = 1 (that basically
follows from strict mass-action). My approach therefore extends the one in
Mesze´na et al. (2005) and avoids the complicacies of functional analysis. I
assume that the functional r is obtained through the iterative procedure de-
scribed in Sect. 2.2, which is ultimately the only way to describe pairwise
interactions by smoothly operating on the distribution ν.
The presented approach (as well as the one in Mesze´na et al., 2005) is
restricted to the case of unstructured populations, i.e., to cases in which
the population abundances can be considered as complete descriptions of
the populations’ state (this is often justified by the time-scale separation
argument used in Box 2, as the dynamics of the population structure can
be considered at equilibrium on the slower time-scale of ecology, see e.g.
Greiner et al., 1994). However, it is reasonable to expect the approach to
be extendable, with the proper mathematical expertise, to the generality of
structured populations (at least to the case of a finite number of classes).
I see property P4 as the main contribution of this work, rather than
the iterative procedure of Sect. 2.2. The procedure is important because
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it implies property P4, thus justifying its assumption when considering a
generic g-function, instead of a specific one derived through the procedure.
The procedure also implies properties P1–3, though these are more obvious
to be assumed. From a formal point of view, it would be interesting to
prove that properties P1–4 all together imply that the g-function can be
obtained through the procedure. However, in practice, it is enough to know
that properties P1–4 hold by construction of the model. Indeed, besides the
theoretical interest, property P4 has relevant implications when studying the
competition between similar strategies.
For example, by setting xi := x + ε cos θi,
∑M
i=1 cos
2 θi = 1, close to a
reference strategy x, it is possible to express the g-derivatives w.r.t. ε at
ε = 0 in terms of the derivatives of the monomorphic g-function, i.e.,
∂εgM(n1:M ,N1:P , x1:M , x
′, t)
∣∣∣
ε=0
=
M∑
i=1
φ1,1(n,N1:P , x, x
′, t)ri n cos θi = ∂x g1(n,N1:P , x, x
′, t)
M∑
i=1
ri cos θi,
where ri := ni/n is the relative densities of the resident strategy xi. Thus,
the radial expansion (w.r.t. ε along the ray defined by the angles θi, i =
1,...,M) of a generic M-morphic g-function can be characterized in terms
of the monomorphic g-function at the reference strategy x. This allows to
rewrite the ecological model (1) using the total density n and the relative
densities ri as new variables. The total density n (as well as the densities N1:P
of the other species) converges to the monomorphic ecological equilibrium
n¯(x) (N¯1:P (x)) much faster than the relative dynamics between the various
morphs, which can then be studied in isolation, thanks to the time-scale
separation, and characterized in terms of the properties of the monomorphic
fitness. This analysis has been carried out by Mesze´na et al. (2005) up to
first-order in ε to characterize the competition between similar strategies
close to the singular strategies of adaptive dynamics (Geritz et al., 1997,
1998; Dercole and Rinaldi, 2008). Particularly interesting is the extension to
the higher-orders for M = 2, to characterize the resident-invader dynamics
close to degenerate singular strategies. It is however out of the scope of this
paper and will be presented elsewhere.
Switching to evolutionary considerations, after the coexistence of a resi-
dent and an invader morphs, say with strategies x1 and x2 close to a singular
strategy x, the subsequent evolutionary dynamics are ruled by the geometry
of the dimorphic invasion fitness
λ2(x1, x2, x
′) = g2(n¯1(x1, x2), n¯2(x1, x2), N¯1:P (x1, x2), x1, x2, x
′)
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(Metz et al., 1992), where n¯1(x1, x2), n¯2(x1, x2), and N¯1:P (x1, x2) are the
equilibrium densities of ecological coexistence and a time-invariant abiotic
environment has been assumed. As it will be discussed in another contribu-
tion, the dimorphic invasion fitness is nonsmooth and cannot be expanded
w.r.t. (x1, x2) close to (x, x). The expansion must be taken along radial di-
rections in the strategy space (x1, x2), i.e., w.r.t. ε with x1 = x+ ε cos θ and
x2 = x + ε sin θ. Then, by property P4, the ε-expansion of the dimorphic
fitness can be written in terms of the derivatives of the monomorphic one
λ1(x, x
′) = g1(n¯(x), N¯1:P (x), x, x
′).
Specifically, a sort of normal form approach, borrowed from bifurcation the-
ory, should become possible to fully characterize the adaptive dynamics after
evolutionary branching in terms of invasion criteria to be evaluated before
branching.
In conclusion, the proposed procedure for building asexual (unstructured,
deterministic) ecological models, and property P4 in particular, open up new
directions along which the theoretical aspects of ecology and evolutionary
biology can be investigated.
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Box 1
The equivalent chemical reactions (left) and the ODEs (right) of the Lotka-
Volterra M -prey-one-predator model (i, j = 1,...,M):
ni
r(xi)
−−−−−→ 2ni
ni + nj
c(xi, xj)
−−−−−→ nj
ni +N
a(xi)
−−−−−→ N(1 + e(xi))
N
d
−−−−−→ null
n˙i = r(xi)ni −
M∑
j=1
c(xi, xj)ninj − a(xi)niN
N˙ =
M∑
j=1
e(xj)a(xj)njN − dN
The translation of the chemical reactions into the ODEs for the population densi-
ties follows the rule
αn + βN
k
−−−−−→ γn+ δN
n˙ = −αϕ+ γϕ, ϕ := knαNβ
N˙ = −βϕ+ δϕ
where:
– n and N are the densities of the reacting populations;
– α and β are nonnegative integers such that 1 ≤ α + β ≤ 2, i.e., one or two
molecules are reacting;
– γ and δ are nonnegative coefficients defining the products of the reaction;
– k is the kinetic rate of the reaction;
– ϕ is the encounter rate, i.e., the number of encounters of the type αn+ βN
per unit of time;
– αϕ (resp. βϕ) molecules of n (resp. N) are consumed per unit of time
(and of space), whereas γϕ (resp. δϕ) are produced, the balance giving the
dynamics of n (resp. N).
The chemical reactions, from top to bottom, describe:
– prey reproduction, one individual producing a second one at rate r(xi) =
birth rate− death rate;
– prey mortality due to intra-specific competition, individuals i and j (resp.
of populations ni and nj) are involved in a contest, j survives;
– predation of a prey individual of population ni and predator reproduction
with prey-to-predator conversion factor e(xi);
– predator mortality at rate d.
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Box 2
The equivalent chemical reactions (left) and the ODEs (right) of the behav-
iorally structured M -prey-one-predator model (i, j = 1,...,M):
ni
r(xi)
−−−−−→ 2ni
ni+ nj
c(xi, xj)
−−−−−→ nj
ni+ S
a(xi)/ε
−−−−−→ Hi+(1− ε)ni
Hi
1/εh(xi)
−−−−−→ S(1+ εe(xi))
S
d
−−−−−→ null
Hi
d
−−−−−→ null
n˙i = r(xi)ni −
M∑
j=1
c(xi, xj)ninj − a(xi)niS
εS˙ = −
M∑
j=1
a(xj)njS+
M∑
j=1
1+ εe(xj)
h(xj)
Hj− εdS
εH˙i = a(xi)niS −
Hi
h(xi)
− εdHi
N˙ = S˙ +
M∑
j=1
H˙j =
M∑
j=1
e(xj)
h(xj)
Hj − dN
The predator population is partitioned into the searching and handling subpopu-
lations N = S +
∑M
j=1Hj. Prey capturing and handling are assumed to be fast
processes (ε small) compared with prey reproduction, competition, and predator
mortality. At each prey-predator encounter, a fraction ε of prey is consumed and
the corresponding amount of predator newborn is εe(xi). The Holling-type-II func-
tional response is obtained in the limit ε→ 0 of the time-scale separation, yielding
the fast equilibrium
S¯ = N
(
1+
M∑
j=1
a(xj)h(xj)nj
)
−1
H¯i = a(xi)h(xi)niN
(
1+
M∑
j=1
a(xj)h(xj)nj
)
−1
and the following slow unstructured equations (after substituting S and Hi with
S¯ and H¯i):
n˙i = r(xi)ni −
M∑
j=1
c(xi, xj)ninj − a(xi)niN
(
1+
M∑
j=1
a(xj)h(xj)nj
)
−1
(B2.1a)
N˙ =
M∑
j=1
e(xj)a(xi)njN
(
1+
M∑
j=1
a(xj)h(xj)nj
)
−1
− dN (B2.1b)
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Box 3
Direct formulation of the nonlinear fitness for the Holling-type-II M -prey-one-
predator model. The prey g-function for model (B2.1) is time-invariant and reads:
gM (n1:M , N, x1:M , x
′) := r(x′)−
M∑
j=1
c(x′, xj)nj−a(x
′)N
(
1+
M∑
j=1
a(xj)h(xj)nj
)
−1
.
It can be constructed with the procedure of Sect. 2.2 in one step (L = 1) with the
following time-invariant interacting kernels:
e(1)n (x
′, x) := c(x′, x) and eN,1(x) := a(x)h(x)
(the subscript 1 indicates the first component of eN , a second is needed later)
yielding
E(1)n (x
′, x1:M , n1:M ) =
M∑
j=1
c(x′, xj)nj and EN,1(x1:M , n1:M ) =
M∑
j=1
a(xj)h(xj)nj ,
and with the following g-function:
g(x′, En(x
′, x1:M , n1:M ), EN (x1:M , n1:M ), N) :=
r(x′)−E(1)n (x
′, x1:M , n1:M )−
a(x′)N
1+EN,1(x1:M , n1:M )
(the abiotic environmental factors are constant parameters that shape the demo-
graphic functions r, c, a, and h, so the argument e is omitted in the formulation).
One step is sufficient because intra-specific interactions only occur through compe-
tition and the competition coefficient c(x′, xj) does not depend on the concomitant
activities of the involved xj-strategist. Note that g does not depend directly on
the resident prey densities n1,..., nM , but the density dependence indirectly occurs
through the environmental quantities in E
(1)
n and EN,1.
Taking the first and second derivatives of g2 w.r.t. x1, replacing whenever pos-
sible n1+n2 with n (i.e., replacing n2 with n−n1 and simplifying the resulting
expression), and collecting the remaining powers of n1, one gets (see Supplemen-
tary Material):
∂x1
g2(n1, n2, N, x1, x2, x
′)
∣∣∣
x1=x2=x
= φ1,1(n,N, x, x
′)n1,
∂x21
g2(n1, n2, N, x1, x2, x
′)
∣∣∣
x1=x2=x
= φ2,1(n,N, x, x
′)n1 + φ2,2(n,N, x, x
′)n21,
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with
φ1,1(n,N,x,x
′) =
a(x′)(∂xa(x)h(x) + a(x)∂xh(x))
(1 + a(x)h(x)n)2
N− ∂xc(x
′, x),
φ2,1(n,N,x,x
′) =
a(x′)(∂x2a(x)h(x)+2∂xa(x)∂xh(x)+a(x)∂x2h(x))
(1 + a(x)h(x)n)2
N−∂x2c(x
′, x),
φ2,2(n,N,x,x
′) = −
2a(x′)(∂xa(x)h(x) + a(x)∂xh(x))
2
(1 + a(x)h(x)n)3
N.
Taking the second mixed derivative of g3 w.r.t. x1,2, replacing replacing n3 with
n−n1−n2, simplifying, and collecting the monomial n1n2, one gets:
∂x1,x2g3(n1, n2, n3, N, x1, x2, x3, x
′)
∣∣
x1=x2=x3=x
= φ1,1,1,1(n,N, x, x
′)n1n2,
with φ1,1,1,1 = φ2,2 as expected from (9a).
Similarly, from (B2.1b), the predator population growth rate reads:
FM (n1:M , N, x1:M ) :=
M∑
j=1
e(xj)a(xj)njN
(
1+
M∑
j=1
a(xj)h(xj)nj
)
−1
− dN.
It can be constructed with the procedure of Sect. 2.2 with the further interacting
kernel
eN,2(x) := e(x)a(x), yielding EN,2(x1:M , n1:M) =
M∑
j=1
e(xj)a(xj)nj,
and with the following F -function:
F (EN (x1:M , n1:M), N) =
EN,2(x1:M , n1:M )
1+EN,1(x1:M , n1:M )
N − dN.
Taking the first and second derivatives of F2 w.r.t. x1, replacing n2 with n−n1,
simplifying, and collecting n1-powers, one gets (see Supplementary Material):
∂x1
F2(n1, n2, N, x1, x2)
∣∣∣
x1=x2=x
= ψ1,1(n,N, x)n1,
∂x21
F2(n1, n2, N, x1, x2)
∣∣∣
x1=x2=x
= ψ2,1(n,N, x)n1 + ψ2,2(n,N, x)n
2
1,
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with
ψ1,1(n,N,x) =
∂xe(x)a(x)
1 + a(x)h(x)n
N +
e(x)
(
∂xa(x)− a(x)
2∂xh(x)n
)
(1 + a(x)h(x)n)2
N,
ψ2,1(n,N,x) =
∂x2e(x)a(x) + 2∂xe(x)∂xa(x)
1+a(x)h(x)n
N
e(x)
(
∂x2a(x)− a(x)
2∂x2h(x)n − 2a(x)∂xa(x)∂xh(x)n
)
(1+a(x)h(x)n)2
N,
ψ2,2(n,N,x) = −
2 (∂xa(x)h(x) + a(x)∂xh(x)) ∂xe(x)a(x)
(1+a(x)h(x)n)2
N
−
2 (∂xa(x)h(x) + a(x)∂xh(x)) e(x)
(
∂xa(x)− a(x)
2∂xh(x)n
)
(1+a(x)h(x)n)3
N.
Taking the second mixed derivative of F3 w.r.t. x1,2, replacing replacing n3 with
n−n1−n2, simplifying, and collecting the monomial n1n2, one gets:
∂x1,x2F3(n1, n2, n3, N, x1, x2, x3)|x1=x2=x3=x = ψ1,1,1,1(n,N, x)n1n2,
with ψ1,1,1,1 = ψ2,2 as expected from (10a). Other relations between (same-order)
k- and k′-index-φ’s and ψ’s, k′ < k, as well as to other consistency relations are
checked in the Supplementary Material.
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Box 4
Direct formulation of the single-species nonlinear fitness for the model of can-
nibalistic community described in Dercole and Rinaldi (2002). The g-function is
time-invariant and reads:
gM (n1:M , x1:M , x
′) := e
a0(x
′)n0+
M∑
j=1
a(x′, xj)nj
1+a0(x
′)h(x′)n0+
M∑
j=1
a(x′, xj)h(x
′)nj
−
M∑
j=1
a(xj , x
′)nj
1+a0(xj)h(xj)n0+
M∑
k=1
a(xj , xk)h(xj)nk
− c
M∑
j=1
nj. (B4.1)
For an individual with cannibalistic attitude x′, the growth rate gM describes
reproduction in the first term, through the harvesting of a common resource n0
and cannibalism toward the resident populations nj, j = 1,...,M , death due to
cannibalistic attacks in the second term, and intra-specific competition for space
and other limiting resources, at last (see Dercole and Rinaldi, 2002, for a more
detailed description of the model).
The g-function (B4.1) can be constructed with the procedure of Sect. 2.2 in
two steps (L = 2) with time-invariant interacting kernels
e(1)n (x
′,x) := [a(x′,x), a(x′,x)h(x′),1], (B4.2a)
e(2)n (x
′,x,E(1)n (x, x1:M, n1:M )) :=
a(x,x′)
1+a0(x)h(x)n0+E
(1)
n,2(x, x1:M, n1:M )
,(B4.2b)
and with the g-function
g(x′,En(x
′,x1:M, n1:M )) := e
a0(x
′)n0+E
(1)
n,1(x
′,x1:M, n1:M )
1+a0(x
′)h(x′)n0+E
(1)
n,2(x
′,x1:M, n1:M)
−E(2)n (x
′,x1:M, n1:M )−cE
(1)
n,3(x
′,x1:M, n1:M ).
Note that E
(1)
n,2(x
′,x1:M, n1:M ) =
∑M
j=1 a(x
′, xj)h(x
′)nj (the second component of
E
(1)
n ) is evaluated with x′= x in the denominator of e
(2)
n and the integration of e
(2)
n
gives for E
(2)
n (x′,x1:M, n1:M ) the sum in the second term of gM in (B4.1). Another
way to see the two steps is noting that two indexes are necessary in the second
term of gM to span the resident strategies: j for the interactions of the x
′-strategist
(step 2) and k for the concomitant interactions of the xj-strategist (step 1).
The expressions of functions φ1,1, φ2,1, and φ2,2 are cumbersome to be reported
here and are left in the Supplementary Material.
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To show a case in which an interacting kernel (of level l ≥ 2) of the focus
species depends on the density of another interacting species (see eq. (4b)), let us
now consider the dynamics of the common resource n0, e.g. the logistic growth
FM (n1:M , n0, x1:M ) := n0r
(
1−
n0
K
)
− n0
M∑
j=1
a0(xj)nj
1+a0(xj)h(xj)n0+
M∑
k=1
a(xj , xk)h(xj)nk
.
(B3.3)
It then becomes evident that e
(2)
n in (B4.2b) depends on n0 (the left-hand side
formally becomes e
(2)
n (x′,x,E1(x, x1:M, n1:M ), n0), n0 now being a dynamic variable
of model (1) and not anymore a constant environmental parameter), and this is due
to the fact that the intra-specific interaction described by e
(2)
n —predation—extends
to the conspecifics strategies x1, x2,..., xM as well as to the common resource n0.
The inter-specific interacting kernel here reads:
eN (x,E
(1)
n (x, x1:M, n1:M ), n0) :=
a0(x)
1+a0(x)h(x)n0+ E
(1)
n,2(x,x1:M, n1:M )
and gives the population growth rate (B3.3) through the F -function
F (EN (x1:M , n1:M , n0), n0) = n0r
(
1−
n0
K
)
− n0EN (x1:M , n1:M , n0).
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